Six months of secret planning – then Israel moves against Hamas

‘Patience
ran out’ over repeated missile attacks in south of country but strategy
risks creating fresh motives for revenge and hatred

[NOTE: See ICAHD’s statement concerning Israel’s attack and Israel’s use of “conflict management.”]

Even as Israel’s F16s were aiming their first deadly salvoes at
Hamas positions in the Gaza Strip on Saturday, questions were being
asked at home and abroad, about what this “shock and awe” campaign was
intended to achieve – and what Israel’s exit strategy would be.

Preparations

Unlike
the confused and improvised Israeli response as the war against
Hizbullah in Lebanon unfolded in 2006, Operation Cast Lead appears to
have been carefully prepared over a long period.

Israeli media
reports, by usually well-informed correspondents and analysts, alluded
yesterday to six months of intelligence-gathering to pinpoint Hamas
targets including bases, weapon silos, training camps and the homes of
senior officials. The cabinet spent five hours discussing the plan in
detail on December 19 and left the timing up to Ehud Olmert, the
caretaker prime minister, and his defence minister Ehud Barak.
Preparations involved disinformation and deception which kept Israel’s
media in the dark. According to Ha’aretz, that also lulled Hamas into a
sense of false security and allowed the initial aerial onslaught to
achieve tactical surprise – and kill many of the 290 victims counted so
far.

Friday’s decision to allow food, fuel and humanitarian
supplies into besieged Gaza – ostensibly a gesture in the face of
international pressure to relieve the ongoing blockade – was part of
this. So was Thursday’s visit to Cairo by Tzipi Livni, Israel’s foreign
minister, to brief Egyptian officials. The final decision was
reportedly made on Friday morning.

Why now?

Barak
said yesterday the timing of the operation was dictated by Israel’s
patience simply “having running out” in the face of renewed rocket and
mortar attacks from Gaza into Israel when the shaky six-month ceasefire
expired 10 days ago. “Any other sovereign nation would do the same,” is
the official Israeli refrain. Amid the storm of international criticism
of Israel’s hugely disproportionate response, it is easy to overlook
the domestic pressure faced by the Israeli government over its handling
of “Hamastan”.

Homemade Qassam rockets and mortars rarely kill
but they do terrify and have undermined Israel’s deterrent power as
well as keeping 250,000 residents of the south of the country in
permanent danger.

But the context now is February’s Israeli
elections. The contest that matters is between Livni’s centrist Kadima
party and the rightwing Likud under Binyamin Netanyahu, who talks only
of “economic peace” with the Palestinians and does not want an
independent Palestinian state, as Livni does. Opinion polls show that
it pays to talk tough: Livni’s standing has improved in recent days.
The US political timetable may be as significant. The three weeks
before Barack Obama’s inauguration were Israel’s last chance to assume
automatic diplomatic support from Washington, as it got from George
Bush over both West Bank settlements and the Lebanon war.

It is
hard to imagine an Israeli government testing Obama, whom it views with
foreboding because of a sense he has more sympathy for the
Palestinians, with a crisis of these dimensions during his first days
or weeks in office.

Game plan

Livni and
other Israeli officials have spoken openly of wishing to topple Hamas
since the Islamist movement took over from the western-backed,
Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority (PA) in June 2007. But this may
be something less ambitious. “The realistic objective of any military
operation is not the ousting of Hamas, but rather … undermining its
military effectiveness and weakening its rule,” is the view of Yediot
Aharonot analyst Alex Fishman. Ron Ben-Yishai, another military expert,
called it an attempt to “change the rules of the game.” This appears to
be a case of “asymmetric warfare” in which the weaker party commands
disproportionate force – by repeatedly firing crude rockets or using
suicide bombers – and the more powerful one responds with a massive,
disproportionate blow. “The objective of an Israeli military operation
in Gaza must be to undermine Hamas’ desire to keep fighting, and at
that point agree on a ceasefire,” said Fishman.

Israel is
well-informed about what happens in Gaza. Its premise is that Hamas is
unpopular and that by targeting its personnel it can encourage that
trend. But not all the victims are from Hamas. Some are civilians and
there are security officers who belong to Fatah. And nor, crucially,
has the PA been able to deliver a peace agreement with Israel, or even
end its settlement activity. Most significantly, the scale of the
bloodshed – ranking in Palestinian history alongside the 1948 Deir
Yassin killings or the Sabra and Shatila massacres (by Israel’s
Christian Lebanese allies) in 1982 means renewed motives for hatred and
revenge.

What next?

Israel said yesterday
that it is calling up thousands of reservists. There can be little
doubt that it could reoccupy and hold the coastal strip – as it did
from 1967 to 2005 – but tanks and infantry would be vulnerable in
guerrilla warfare against lightly-armed but highly-motivated Hamas or
Islamic Jihad fighters. Civilian casualties would grow with
international pressure. The only reason to deploy ground forces would
be to achieve something air power could not – searching for rocket
production and storage facilities that have not yet been identified.

Israeli
commentators suggest the army has no appetite for a ground war, making
comparisons with Lebanon in 2006, and pointing to the impending
elections. Another key question for the military must be the fate of
Gilad Shalit, the Israeli corporal held in Gaza since he was captured
in 2006. It is hard to see negotiations on his release, and of
Palestinian prisoners held by Israel, continuing in these circumstances.

Repercussions

The
Gaza offensive has already fuelled anti-Israeli and anti-American
feeling across the Arab world. Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian
president, faces demands for an end to any talks with Israel. Hamas,
calling for a “third intifada,” accused Egypt and Jordan of colluding
with the Gaza plan. If there is a silver lining in this dark cloud it
is to have shown that working to achieve a lasting peace in the Middle
East is still a desperately urgent task.