In the second of a four-part review of what comes after Bush, Azmi Bishara laments that the trope of “good versus evil” in US political culture will prevail for some time to come

It was 11 September that fired both the neoconservatives’ and the
liberals’ zeal to go to war, even before the National Security Council
was convinced by their justifications. Both had a perception of
America’s global role and its historic mission. Thus we find Francis
Fukuyama, Richard Armitage and Robert Zoellick together among the
signatories of the petition to Clinton calling for Saddam’s forcible
removal. We also find regular columnists in such major liberal
newspapers as The New York Times, The Washington Post, The New Yorker and The New Republic
coming out in favour of the war, along with many former Clinton
officials and Senator Hillary Clinton as well. The neoconservatives and
Democrats had converged over what America should do to protect its
national interests and secure oil supplies and how it should behave,
which included the right and duty to do what it sees fit without having
to bother obtaining international approval. In their eyes, the American
empire was the natural leader of the coalition of the willing.

Undoubtedly, the outlook of the neoconservatives converged with
that of many erstwhile leftists in this part of the world who were now
looking for a new deliverance theory to take the place of communism.
These now began to treat democratic theory as the panacea, and they
also looked forward to a blatant and decisive American military
intervention. The former left in the Third World had grown so
accustomed to the outside Soviet revolutionising agent that when the
Cold War was over they turned to America’s “permanent revolution”. They
had grown even more accustomed to anticipating the will of their
people.

What distinguishes the neoconservatives is not their conservatism,
in the sense that they are among the ranks of the American right that
believe in American military might, the market economy and an
ultra-chauvinistic American patriotism. Rather, it is the way they use
various liberal values and principles, and even some leftist fads such
as political correctness, to promote what they have identified as US
interests. In the past, of course, at the height of the Cold War,
Washington used “values and principles” to rally world opinion behind
it in its fight against communism. These values were, variously, faith
versus godlessness, freedom versus tyranny, democracy versus
dictatorship, and the like. It would not have entered anyone’s head
until around the Reagan era to reduce the international balance of
power to such factors as the security vulnerability of Europe, mutual
interests, oil and arms sales, not when on the other side there was a
regime that laid claim to a philosophy that would free the world. This
was communism; an ideology that structurally and organisationally bore
considerable resemblance to a religion.

It may be useful, here, to recall that moment in which securing
control of oil resources in the name of freedom made its first
historical appearance in the Middle East. That was not Saudi Arabia
where the US monopoly over oil there dates to the 1930s, via an
unshakable partnership with regard to which the US has developed a very
prickly sensitivity towards anyone — friend or foe — who might try to
elbow in. In Saudi Arabia, oil security adopted the guise of defending
religion against the threats of communist atheism and defending
traditions against nationalist modernism. Rather, the façade of
defending freedom in the face of communism was first brought into play
by the Eisenhower administration in order to justify its support for
the British-engineered coup against the Iranian national leader, the
relatively enlightened Mohammed Mossadegh. Britain, at the time, feared
that Iran might nationalise the Iranian oil industry. The US was
rewarded for its efforts in championing freedom over communism and
restoring the Shah to power with 40 per cent of the shares in the
British- Iranian petroleum company that monopolised oil drilling and
refinery activities in the country.

Still, there is an essential difference between this and what the
neoconservatives used when they came into their own in the US
administration after 11 September. With them, the ultra right
appropriated the utopianism and quasi- religious redemptionist theories
of the left, and campaigned effectively to put these theories into
practice by force of arms. All societies could be changed, they held,
because societies were essentially the same and there was no such thing
as a society or culture that was not suited to democracy (which
enlightened rhetoric would quickly be seized upon by the domestic
erstwhile left). But if democracy did not take hold, they turned around
and laid the blame on the societies themselves, as occurred in Iraq,
whose culture and sectarian order, which actually arose from the
occupation, they held accountable for democracy’s failure there. Such
is the foreign policy approach of the neoconservatives. They justify
the use of force to change human beings and their societies. Their
outlook is reminiscent of the Jacobins in revolutionary France, and the
Bolsheviks and Trotskyites, only these ones are coming from the far
right.

Their ideal seems suitable for every place and age, and is why they
do not come off as racist. Their democratic utopia is accessible to all
societies, regardless of cultural differences. Their approach also
reminds one of redemptionist doctrines that reduce ideas, politics and
people to good versus evil and that justify the most atrocious violence
against that “evil” in the name of “good”. Moreover, this violent
utopianism represented by the neoconservatives has acquired a strong
evangelical edge.

It is not enough that, according to the polls, 90 per cent of
Americans describe themselves as religious and that 80 per cent believe
to some extent in miracles. The fundamentalist churches and their
perceptions of good and evil have been having a steadily mounting
impact on US policy. I am not just talking about questions of abortion,
gay marriage and religious instruction in public schools. They have
been growing increasingly active and effective in lobbying for their
vision of America’s divine mission to combat “evil” (such as Islam)
and, of particular concern to them, to advance Biblical prophecies with
regard to the resurrection of Israel, the “ingathering” of Jews and the
second coming of Christ.

Even after Bush leaves the White House, the influence of religious
zealotry the generally tolerant American political culture will remain.
Look how presidential candidate Obama, in that supposedly secular
nation, had to proclaim that he was a devout Christian and had “opened
his heart to Jesus”. Even more shocking was that televised debate in
the Saddleback Church in California between Obama and McCain, mediated
by Pastor Rick Warren who wants to inherit the mantle of Billy Graham.
Not only was the first debate between the two candidates held in a
church, the clergy set the beat! Moreover, much of the substance, such
as it was, of that first debate revolved around how each of the
candidates would combat evil — literally. Pastor Warren asked them,
“What are your plans for confronting evil?” This oversimplification of
the treatment of political issues distorts public opinion, undermines
political culture and lends itself to a facile handling of complex
problems, which is merely to vilify the adversary.

This dangerous superficial political culture will not reverse
itself regardless of who succeeds Bush. Obama’s protestations with
regard to his Christian upbringing and his refutation of the attribute
of Muslim, as though it would be a taint on his person, are indicative
of the depth to which religious rhetoric has permeated the public
sphere in the US.

For a brief period, conservatives and liberals were of one mind
over their goals and the instruments to achieve them. These led to a
string of disasters that, in turn, drove the two camps apart amidst a
torrent of mutual recriminations. The collapse of the state in Iraq,
the rise of the Iraqi resistance, regional and international revulsion
at the consequences of American-led aggression, the failure of the
so-called war against terrorism, the failure of the American war
against the Lebanese resistance using Israeli instruments, severely
eroded the US’s international prestige and drove a wedge through
American society. It was a necessity that forced Washington to change
its policies, not an awakening of conscience. In like manner, it was
political expedience that compelled the liberals to disassociate
themselves from the neocons. From here it was a short road to the end
of the phase of international and domestic tolerance of America’s
post-11 September delirium. All of which occurred before the Georgia
experience and the resurgence of Russian nationalist policy.

The conservatives have been at odds with themselves, caught as they
were between their conventional isolationism and the necessity of
involvement in fulfilment of Washington’s responsibilities to its new
allies. Moreover, these now had begun to rely on the balance of
international power to swing unfavourable local and regional equations
to their favour, and they became prey to a bout of trigger-happiness.
The instances of Lebanon in 2006-2008 and Georgia in 2008 illustrate.
And, in both cases, US warships shuttled back and forth along the coast
and either sailed off or did not act when required. But there still
remains that type of local leadership that floated to the surface in
the climate of American belligerency, constantly led down and having to
change tack and deal with local balances of power that bear no
resemblance to the international ones that suddenly seem to have been
neutralised. It turns out that the attempt to project international
power balances on the local scene sets off wars and disasters that the
US cannot resolve.

Little wonder that, regionally, forces allied to the US are now
attempting to carve for themselves a larger realm of relative autonomy
in the formulation of their alliances and conduct of their foreign
relations. In other words, the world appears to be returning to the
pre-11 September period and the increasing dismay with mono- polarity.
There is a difference, however. Today, we are observing the reversion
to the nation state, in general, with greater emphasis on the role of
the major powers, with regard to which one notes a distinction between
the majority of these and the superpower. There is still only one of
these and it spends more on arms than the next 45 highest spending
countries combined, and this expenditure accounts for only four per
cent of its GDP. These are definitely superpower figures. However,
there are countries that are seeking to play the part of regional
powers and seek a considerable measure of autonomy on matters that
touch upon their national interests. The more they succeed in this
endeavour, the more this erodes American hegemony and sets its limits.
Among these strong, economically emerging powers are India and Brazil,
which are allies, not foes, to the US. In fact, we can say that with
India the US has gained an important ally in Asia. Not all cases of
emerging powers are like Russia and China. But China and Russia are
there.