Responsibility for this spectacular tragedy must lie with those who ignored the facts five years ago

The invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a tragedy – for Iraq, for the US,
for the UN, for truth and human dignity. I can only see one gain: the
end of Saddam Hussein, a murderous tyrant. Had the war not finished him
he would, in all likelihood, have become another Gadafy or Castro; an
oppressor of his own people but no longer a threat to the world. Iraq
was on its knees after a decade of sanctions.

The
elimination of weapons of mass destruction was the declared main aim of
the war. It is improbable that the governments of the alliance could
have sold the war to their parliaments on any other grounds. That they
believed in the weapons’ existence in the autumn of 2002 is
understandable. Why had the Iraqis stopped UN inspectors during the 90s
if they had nothing to hide? Responsibility for the war must rest,
though, on what those launching it knew by March 2003.

By then,
Unmovic inspectors had carried out some 700 inspections at 500 sites
without finding prohibited weapons. The contract that George Bush held
up before Congress to show that Iraq was purchasing uranium oxide was
proved to be a forgery. The allied powers were on thin ice, but they
preferred to replace question marks with exclamation marks.

They
could not succeed in eliminating WMDs because they did not exist. Nor
could they succeed in the declared aim to eliminate al-Qaida operators,
because they were not in Iraq. They came later, attracted by the
occupants. A third declared aim was to bring democracy to Iraq,
hopefully becoming an example for the region. Let us hope for the
future; but five years of occupation has clearly brought more anarchy
than democracy.

Increased safety for Israel might have been an
undeclared US aim. If so, it is hard to see that anything was gained by
a war which has strengthened Iran.

There are other troubling
legacies of the Iraq war. It is a setback in the world’s efforts to
develop legal restraints on the use of armed force between states. In
1945 the US helped to write into the UN charter a prohibition of the
use of armed force against states. Exceptions were made only for
self-defence against armed attacks and for armed force authorised by
the security council. In 2003, Iraq was not a real or imminent threat
to anybody. Instead, the invasion reflects a claim made in the 2002 US
national security strategy that the charter was too restrictive, and
that the US was ready to use armed force to meet threats that were
uncertain as to time and place – a doctrine of preventive war.

In
the 2004 presidential election campaign, Bush ridiculed any idea that
the US would need to ask for a “permission slip” before taking military
action against a “growing threat”. True, the 2003 Iraq invasion is not
the only case in which armed force has been used in disregard of the
charter. However, from the most powerful member of the UN it is a
dangerous signal. If preventive war is accepted for one, it is accepted
for all.

One fear is that the UN rules ignored in the attack on
Iraq will prove similarly insignificant in the case of Iran. But it may
be that the spectacular failure of ensuring disarmament by force, and
of introducing democracy by occupation, will work in favour of a
greater use of diplomacy and “soft power”. Justified concerns about
North Korea and Iran have led the US, as well as China, Russia and
European states, to examine what economic and other non-military
inducements they may use to ensure that these two states do not procure
nuclear weapons. Washington and Moscow must begin nuclear disarmament.
So long as these nuclear states maintain that these weapons are
indispensable to their security, it is not surprising that others may
think they are useful. What, really, is the alternative: invasion and
occupation, as in Iraq?

· Hans Blix was head of UN inspections in Iraq in 2003 secretariat@wmdcommission.org