- Details
-
Written by Mustafa Barghouthi Mustafa Barghouthi
-
Category: News News
-
Published: 14 August 2009 14 August 2009
-
Last Updated: 14 August 2009 14 August 2009
-
Created: 14 August 2009 14 August 2009
-
Hits: 3176 3176
What we Palestinians need
Mustafa Barghouthi
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2009/960/op13.htm
Irrespective of what political settlement is ultimately embraced,
Palestinians need a unified strategy for confronting and overcoming
Israeli racism, apartheid and oppression. Mustafa Barghouthi* outlines
the basis of such a strategy
Palestinians have only two choices before them, either to continue to
evade the struggle, as some have been trying to do, or to summon the
collective national resolve to engage in it.
The latter option does not necessarily entail a call to arms. Clearly
Israel has the overwhelming advantage in this respect in both
conventional and unconventional (nuclear) weapons. Just as obviously,
neighbouring Arab countries have neither the will nor ability to go the
military route. However, the inability to wage war does not
automatically mean surrender and eschewing other means to wage struggle.
As powerful as it is militarily, Israel has two major weak points.
Firstly, it cannot impose political solutions by force of arms on a
people determined to sustain a campaign of resistance. This has been
amply demonstrated in two full-scale wars against Lebanon and, most
recently, in the assault against Gaza. Secondly, the longer the
Palestinians have remained steadfast, and the greater the role the
demographic factor has come to play in the conflict, the more clearly
Israel has emerged as an apartheid system hostile to peace. If the
ethnic cleansing of 1948 and the colonialist expansionism describe the
circumstances surrounding the birth of the Israeli state, the recent
bills regarding the declaration of allegiance to a Jewish state and
prohibiting the Palestinian commemoration of the nakba more explicitly
underscore its essential racist character.
Ironically, just as Israel has attained the peak in its drive to
fragment the Palestinian people, with geographical divides between
those in Israel and those abroad, between Jerusalem and the West Bank
and the West Bank and Gaza, and between one governorate and the next in
the West Bank by means of ring-roads, walls and barriers, Palestinians
have become reunified in their hardship and in the challenges that
confront them. Regardless of whether or not they bear Israeli
citizenship, or whether they are residents of Jerusalem, the West Bank
or Gaza, they all share the plight of being victims of Israel's
systematic discrimination and apartheid order.
If the only alternative to evading the struggle is to engage in it in
order to resolve it, we must affirm that our national liberation
movement is still alive. We must affirm, secondly, that political and
diplomatic action is a fundamental part of managing the conflict, as
opposed to an alternative to it. In fact, we must elevate it to our
primary means for exposing the true nature of Israel, isolating it
politically and pressing for international sanctions against it.
In this context, we must caution against the theory of building state
institutions under the occupation. An administration whose security
services would be consuming 35 per cent of the public budget, that
would be acting as the occupation's policeman while furthering
Netanyahu's scheme for economic normalisation as a substitute for a
political solution, is clearly geared to promote the acclimatisation to
the status quo, not change. Building Palestinian governing institutions
and promoting genuine economic development must occur within the
framework of a philosophy of "resistance development". Such a
philosophy is founded on the dual principles of supporting the people's
power to withstand the hardships of the occupation and reducing
dependency on foreign funding and foreign aid. The strategic aim of the
Palestinian struggle, under this philosophy, must be to "make the costs
of the Israeli occupation and its apartheid system so great as to be
unsustainable".
If we agree on this course for conducting the struggle, then the next
step is to adopt a unified national strategy founded upon four pillars:
1. Resistance. In all its forms, resistance is an internationally
sanctioned right of the Palestinian people. Under this strategy,
however, it must resume a peaceful, mass grassroots character that will
serve to revive the culture of collective activism among all sectors of
the Palestinian people and, hence, to keep the struggle from becoming
the preserve or monopoly of small cliques and to promote its growing
impetus and momentum. Models for this type of resistance already exist.
Of particular note is the brave and persistent campaign against the
Separation Wall, which has spread across several towns and villages,
offered five lives to the cause, and become increasingly adamant. The
resistance by the people of East Jerusalem and Silwan against Israeli
home demolitions and the drive to Judaise the city presents another
heroic model. Yet a third promising example is to be found it the
movement to boycott Israeli goods and to encourage the consumption of
locally produced products. In addition to preventing the occupation
power from milking the profits from marketing locally produced
products, this form of resistance can engage the broadest swath of the
population, from old to young and men and women, and revive the culture
and spirit of communal collaboration. The campaigns to break the
blockade against Gaza, as exemplified by the protest ships, the supply
caravans and the pressures on Israel to lift its economic stranglehold,
are another major type of resistance.
2. Supporting national steadfastness. The importance of this pillar is
its focus on strengthening the demographic power of the Palestinian
people so as to transform their millions into an effective grassroots
force. It entails meeting their essential needs to enable them to
remain steadfast in their struggle, and developing Palestinian human
resources as the foundation for a strong and independent Palestinian
economy. However, in order to achieve these aims the Palestinian
Authority (PA) economic plan and budget must be altered in a way that
pits their weight behind development in education, health, agriculture
and culture, as opposed to squandering a third of the budget on
security.
For example, the passage and immediate implementation of the bill for
the national higher education fund would serve the educational needs of
hundreds of thousands of young adults. In addition to elevating and
developing the standards of university education, it would also work to
sustain the impact of development aid and eventually reduce reliance on
foreign support. The fund would also alleviate the school tuition
burdens on more than 150,000 families, put an end to nepotism in the
handling of student study grants and loans, and provide equal
opportunity for academic advancement to all young men and women
regardless of their financial circumstances. Equally innovative and
dynamic ideas could be applied to other areas of education, or to
stimulating the fields of public health, agriculture and culture with
the overall aim of developing the educated, innovative and effective
modern human resources needed to meet Palestinian needs as autonomously
as possible and, hence, capable of weathering enormous pressures.
3. National unity and a unified national leadership. This strategic aim
entails restructuring the Palestine Liberation Organisation on a more
demographically representative basis and putting into effect agreements
that have been previously reached in the Palestinian national dialogues
held in Cairo. Over the past few years, the thrust of Israel's greatest
advantage and the thrust of its assault centred around the Palestinian
rift and the weakness of the disunited Palestinian leadership. In order
to redress this flaw, the Palestinians must adopt a new mentality and
approach. Specifically, they must: relinquish the mentality and
practice of vying for power over an illusory governing authority that
is still under the thumb of the occupation, whether in the West Bank or
in Gaza; give up the illusion that Palestinian military might, however
great it might become, is capable of leading the Palestinian struggle
alone; adopt democracy and pluralistic democratic activities and
processes as a mode of life, self- government, peaceful
decision-making, and the only acceptable means to resolve our
differences and disputes; resist all outside pressures and attempts
(particularly on the part of Israel) to intervene in our internal
affairs and to tamper with the Palestinian popular will. There must be
a firm and unshakeable conviction in Palestinians' right to independent
national self- determination.
The most difficult task that we face today is creating a unified
leadership and strategy binding on all, from which no political or
military decisions will depart, and within which framework no single
group or party has a monopoly on the decision-making processes. Only
with a unified leadership and strategy will we be able to fight the
blockade as one, instead of evading unity for fear of the blockade.
With a unified leadership and strategy we will able to seize the reins
of initiative from others, as opposed to spinning from one reaction to
the other, and we will be able to focus our energies on asserting our
unified will instead of squandering them in internal power struggles in
which the various parties seek outside assistance to strengthen their
hand against their opponents on the inside. Only then will we be able
to shift the equations that subordinated the national liberation
movement to the narrow concerns of the PA (both in the West Bank and
Gaza) and turn the PA into an instrument in the service of the national
liberation movement.
4. Building and enhancing an international pro-Palestinian solidarity
movement combined with a drive to impose sanctions against Israel. That
such a movement already exists and is steadily growing is heartening.
However, it will take enormous efforts to organise it and coordinate
its activities properly so as to ensure it has the greatest possible
influence upon decision-makers, especially in Europe and the West.
Palestinian, Arab and Muslim communities will need to be orchestrated
towards the realisation of the same goals. If the solidarity movement
has scored significant successes with the organisation of a boycott of
Israeli products, the decision by the Federation of British
Universities to boycott Israeli academics, and the decision taken by
Hampshire College and some US churches to refuse to invest in Israel,
much work has yet to be done to expand the scope of such activities and
build up the momentum of the solidarity movement.
The Palestinian plight, which Nelson Mandela has described as the
foremost challenge to the international humanitarian conscience,
strongly resembles the state of South Africa at the outset to the
1980s. It took years of a concerted unified drive before the South
African liberation movement finally succeeded in bringing around
governments to their cause. The tipping point came when major companies
realised that the economic costs of dealing with the apartheid regime
in Pretoria were unsustainable. In the Palestinian case, the success of
an international solidarity movement is contingent upon three major
factors. The first is careful organisation and detailed planning, a
high degree of discipline and tight coordination. Second is a rational,
civilised rhetoric that refuses to play into Israel's tactics of
provocation. The third is to address and recruit progressive movements
and peoples in societies abroad, including anti-Zionist Jews and Jews
opposed to Israeli policies.
None of the foregoing is new, by any means. However, these ideas have
yet to be put into practice. The logical springboard for this is to
operate on the principle that while the Palestinian cause is a
Palestinian, Arab and Muslim one, it is above all a humanitarian cause
that cries out to all in the world who cherish humanitarian principles
and values. The success of the freedom fighters of South Africa, the
anti-Vietnam war movement, and the campaigners for the independence of
India stemmed primarily from their ability to forge a universal appeal.
And this is precisely what we must do. Our mottos for the solidarity
movement with the Palestinian people must be "the fight against the new
apartheid and systematic racism" and "the fight for justice and the
right to freedom." The International Court of Justice's ruling on the
Separation Wall, the illegality of Jewish settlements and altering the
face of Jerusalem is a valuable legal precedent that official
Palestinian governing institutions have ignored for four years. This
ruling should now become our platform for a drive to impose sanctions
against Israel, just as the UN resolution against the occupation of
Namibia proved a platform for mounting a campaign against the apartheid
system in South Africa.
The four-pronged strategy outlined above, which is espoused by the
Palestinian National Initiative Movement, can succeed if it is guided
by a clear vision, patience, and systematic persistence. I do not
expect that it win the approval of all. The interests of some combined
with their sense of frustration and despair have deadened their desire
to engage in or to continue the confrontation with Israel. We also have
to acknowledge that certain sectors of Palestinian society have become
so dependent upon interim arrangements and projects and the attendant
finances as to put paid to the possibility of their contributing to the
fight for real change. Yet, the proposed comprehensive strategy does
respond to and represent the interests of the vast majority of the
Palestinian people and holds the promise of a better future.
The Palestinian national struggle has so far passed through two major
phases: the first steered by Palestinians abroad while ignoring the
role of Palestinians at home, and the second steered by Palestinians at
home while ignoring the role of Palestinians abroad. Today we find
ourselves at the threshold of a third phase, which should combine the
struggle at home and the campaign of Palestinians and their
sympathisers abroad.
In closing I would like to address the subject of a one-state or a
two-state solution. It is both theoretically and practically valid to
raise this subject here for two reasons. First, Israel has consistently
tried to undermine the prospect of Palestinian statehood by pressing
for such formulas as home rule, or an interim state, or a state without
real sovereignty. Second, the changes produced on the ground by Israeli
settlements and ring roads have come to render the realisation of a
viable state unrealisable. To some, especially Palestinians in the
Diaspora, replacing the call for a one-state solution with calling for
a "two-state solution" seems to offer a remedy that gives relief. It is
a better remedy, without a doubt, but it is a long way from offering
relief. Slogans do not end liberation struggles. Slogans without
strategies and efforts to back them up remain nothing but idle wishes
or, to some, a noble way to avoid responsibility and the work that goes
with it.
Now, let us be clear here. Israel has been working around the clock to
destroy the option of an independent Palestinian state on the ground
and, hence, the two-state solution. But that does not leave the
Palestinian people without an alternative, as some Zionist leaders
undoubtedly hope. The single democratic state (not the single
bi-national state) in which all citizens are equal in rights and duties
regardless of their religious affiliations and their origins is an
alternative to the attempt to force the Palestinians to accept slavery
under occupation and an apartheid order in the form of a feeble
autonomous government that is dubbed a state.
However, whether the aim is a truly independent sovereign state or a
single democratic state, both of which Israel dismisses with equal
vehemence, neither of these aims can be achieved without exposing and
destroying the apartheid system. This requires a strategy. Therefore,
instead of allowing ourselves to become divided prematurely over
whether to go for the one-state or two-state solution, let us unify
behind the common aim required to achieve either: the formulation and
implementation of a strategy to fight the occupation, apartheid and
racial discrimination. This will lead us to something that is
absolutely necessary at this stage, which is to move from the world of
slogans to the world of practical activism in accordance with viable
strategic plans that mobilise demonstrators against the wall,
intellectuals and politicians and other sectors of society. It is high
time we realise that diplomatic endeavours and negotiations do not free
us from the nuts and bolts of actual struggle. We have one road that
leads to a single goal: the freedom of the Palestinian people. There is
nothing nobler than to follow this road to its end. This is not a
project for some point in the future; it is one that cannot wait.
Indeed, we should probably adopt the slogan of the freedom fighters of
South Africa: "Freedom in our lifetime!"
* The writer is secretary-general of the Palestinian National Initiative